Causal continuity is usually defined by imposing the conditions (i) distinction and (ii) reflectivity. It is proved here that a new causality property which stays between weak distinction and causality, called feeble distinction, can actually replace distinction in the definition of causal continuity. An intermediate proof shows that feeble distinction and future (past) reflectivity implies past (resp. future) distinction. Some new characterizations of weak distinction and reflectivity are given.
Introduction
Recently Bernal and Sánchez [2] proved that causal simplicity, usually defined by imposing the two properties [1, p. 65] , (a) distinction and (b) for all x ∈ M the sets J + (x) and J − (x) are closed (this property is equivalent to J + = J + , see [7, sect. 3 .10]), can actually be improved by replacing (a) with the weaker requirement of causality. In this work I give a result which goes in the same direction of optimizing the definitions and results underlying the causal hierarchy of the spacetimes.
Causal continuity is usually defined by imposing the conditions [3, p. 294] [1, p. 59,70] (i) distinction and (ii) reflectivity. The distinction condition was defined, quite naturally, by Hawking and Sachs [3, p. 292] as the imposition of both future and past distinction. At the time, Kronheimer and Penrose had already defined the past, future and the weak distinction properties [4, p. 486] as follows: a spacetime is future distinguishing if I + (x) = I + (z) ⇒ x = z; past distinguishing if I − (x) = I − (z) ⇒ x = z; and weakly distinguishing if "I + (x) = I + (z) and I − (x) = I − (z)" ⇒ x = z. Clearly, future (past) distinction implies weak distinction and there are examples of spacetimes which are weakly distinguishing but neither future nor past distinguishing (see figure 1(B) ), thus weak distinction is a strictly weaker property than future or past distinction. Nevertheless, in this work I am going to prove (corollary 4.2) that condition (i) defining causal continuity can be replaced with (i') feeble distinction, a property which, as I will show, is even weaker than weak distinction. This result comes from a interesting lemma which mixes future and past properties (otherwise usually found separated in other theorems), namely feeble distinction and future (past) reflectivity implies past (resp. future) distinction (theorem 4.1).
I denote with (M, g) a C r spacetime (connected, time-oriented Lorentzian manifold), r ∈ {3, . . . , ∞} of arbitrary dimension n ≥ 2 and signature (−, +, . . . , +). On M × M the usual product topology is defined. The subset symbol ⊂ is reflexive, i.e. X ⊂ X. The closure of the causal future on M × M is denoted A + , that is, A + =J + . For other notations concerning causal sets the reader is referred to [6] .
Weak distinction
Since the property of weak distinction has been only marginally used in causality theory I devote a few pages to its study, in particular I develop some equivalent characterizations. The reader is assumed to be familiar with the approach to causal relations as subsets of M × M (see [7] and [6] ).
Recall that the relations on M
are reflexive and transitive. Moreover, the spacetime is future (past) distin-
Recall [6] that D + f = A + iff the spacetime is future reflecting and D
iff the spacetime is past reflecting (for other equivalent characterizations of reflectivity see [7] ). Since
The antisymmetry condition for D + is equivalent to weak distinction, indeed it holds.
Lemma 2.2. The following conditions on a spacetime (M, g) are equivalent
1 ⇒ 2. Assume D + is not antisymmetric then there are x and y, x = y such that (x, y) ∈ D + and (y, x) ∈ D + which reads "y ∈ I + (x) and x ∈ I − (y) and x ∈ I + (y) and y ∈ I − (x)". y ∈ I + (x) and x ∈ I + (y) implies I + (y) = I + (x) while x ∈ I − (y) and y ∈ I − (x) implies I − (y) = I − (x), thus 1 does not hold. 1 ⇒ 3. First, 1 implies that (M, g) is chronological indeed, the existence of w = z with w ≪ z ≪ w would imply I + (w) = I + (z) and I − (w) = I − (z) which contradicts 1. Since (M, g) is chronological for every event z the sets I + (z) and I − (z) are disjoint. Assume 3 does not hold then there are x = y,
But the former possibility can not hold because it implies x ≪ y thus y must belong to I + (y) or I − (y) both cases implying a violation of chronology. Thus I + (x) ⊂ I + (y), and changing the roles of x and y, I
Changing the roles of past and future I − (x) = I − (y) which contradicts 1, hence, by contradiction, 3 must hold.
2 ⇔ (4 and 5). It follows from theorem 2.3(c) of [6] . Remark 2.5. It is easy to prove that past or future distinction at x implies weak distinction at x, however, it is a non trivial matter to find a counterexample of the converse. An example of a weakly distinguishing spacetime in which there is a event p at which the spacetime is neither future nor past distinguishing can be obtained from the spacetime of figure 2 by removing the point q.
Remark 2.6. The possibility of expressing weak distinction through the injectivity of the map x → D + (x), is a consequence of the reflexivity and transitivity of D + (see theorem 2.3(c) of [6] ). Actually, other causality properties such as strong causality can be characterized in terms of the injectivity of a suitable causal set function although, as far as I know, strong causality cannot be obtained as an antisymmetry condition for a suitable reflexive and transitive causal relation. The idea of expressing the causality conditions as injectivity conditions on causal set functions goes back to I. Rácz [8] .
Weak distinction and the causal structures of Kronheimer and Penrose [4] are intimately related as the next two lemmas prove. Proof. We already know that D 
Feeble distinction
Future distinction is equivalent to the antisymmetry of D + f however, it is also equivalent [6] to an apparently weaker requirement, namely (x, z) ∈ J + and (z, x) ∈ D + f ⇒ x = z. It is natural to ask whether weak distinction can be expressed as: (x, z) ∈ J + and (z, x) ∈ D + ⇒ x = z. As we shall see, the answer is negative and the property defines a new level in the causal ladder which stays between weak distinction and causality. 
(x, y) ∈ J
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2. Assume 2 does not hold then there are x and y, x < y such that (y, x) ∈ D + which reads "x < y and x ∈ I + (y) and y ∈ I − (x)". y ∈ I + (x) and x ∈ I + (y) implies I + (y) = I + (x) while x ∈ I − (y) and y ∈ I − (x) implies I − (y) = I − (x), thus 1 does not hold. 2 ⇒ 1. Assume 1 does not hold. There are x < y such that I + (x) = I + (y) and I − (x) = I − (y), thus x ∈ I + (x) = I + (y), y ∈ I − (y) = I − (x). Thus (x, y) ∈ J + and (y, x) ∈ D + , but x = y, a contradiction.
Definition 3.2.
A spacetime is said to be feebly distinguishing if it satisfies one of the equivalent properties of lemma 3.1. In short, a spacetime is feebly distinguishing if there is no pair of causally related events with the same chronological pasts and futures.
Lemma 3.3. If a spacetime is weakly distinguishing then it is feebly distinguishing. If a spacetime if feebly distinguishing then it is causal.
Proof. It follows trivially from the fact that
It is easy to check that feeble distinction differs from causality, see for instance the spacetime of figure 1(A) . It is instead a non trivial matter to establish that feeble distinction differs from weak distinction. Figure 2 gives an example of feebly distinguishing non-weakly distinguishing spacetime. Figure 2 : An example of feebly distinguishing non-weakly distinguishing spacetime. The shaded gray regions have been removed from the manifold. The events p and q share the same chronological past and future and form the only pair of events with this property. They are not causally related thanks to the removed sets, thus the spacetime is feebly distinguishing.
The spacetime example
Since the construction of the spacetime is quite involved I offer the next explanation.
The starting point is a spacetime R × S 1 × R of coordinates (t, x, y), x ∈ [−2, 2], in which the metric has Killing vectors ∂/∂y, ∂/∂x, and the qualitative behavior of the light cones is as displayed in figure 2 . The analytical expression of the metric is not important, but the expression ds I am going to remove suitable sets from the surfaces x = ±1, so as to make the spacetime weakly distinguishing but for the events p, q, which actually will share the same chronological past and future. Since p and q will not be causally related the spacetime so obtained, denoted (M, g), will be feebly distinguishing but non-weakly distinguishing.
The closed sets to be removed are as follows. First a set K, on the surface x = 1, should be removed in order to guarantee that, if weak distinction is violated, then the violation must happen on the x axis. The set K has two boundaries which are tangent to the null plane t = 0, and whose radius of curvature at the point of contact with the plane must be sufficiently large so that the causal futures and pasts of the points lying in the x axis can intersect it only after one complete loop (i.e. the timelike curves issuing from a point on the x axis can intersect K only from the second intersection with the plane x = +1). The figure displays that another set K ′ of the same shape has been removed, but this is done for symmetry purposes, and is not strictly necessary.
Let z be a point in the x axis. Denote with Γ + f (z) the points of first intersection of the causal curves issuing from z with the surface x = +1. This set has a boundary whose equation t(y) = h + f (z)(y) has a Taylor expansion at y = 0 which can be easily determined with a little algebra. An analogous set Γ − f (z) (where the minus sign denotes that the intersection of the causal curves is with the surface x = −1) and past versions can be defined. The point here is that the first terms of this Taylor expansion are quadratic and the coefficient decreases with the distance of z from the surface. The idea is to remove inside Γ
q) and Γ + p (q) suitable sets passing through s and r so that "(p, q) ∈ D + and (q, p) ∈ D + " would still hold as the future (resp. past) of p and q would pass 'below' (resp. 'above') the removed sets. For instance, q would still remain in the closure of the causal future of p. The sets to be removed will be called 'filters' and have an elliptical shape in the figure.
The filters are chosen so that p and q are the only two points with the same past and future. Let us focus on Γ + f (p). If its boundary has Taylor expansion h + f (p)(y) = a 2 (p)y 2 + a 4 (p)y 4 + . . ., choose the set to be removed so that its boundary has Taylor expansion a 2 (p)y 2 + 2|a 4 (p)y 4 + . . . |. Now, what happens is that chosen p ′ between p and r, since a 2 (p ′ ) > a 2 (p), there is a ǫ(p ′ ) > 0 such that the points in Γ + f (p ′ ) with t ≤ ǫ(p ′ ) belong to the removed set. In other words, the causal curves issued from p ′ may 'pass' the filter but if so they are forced to move towards events with t > ǫ(p ′ ) and then, because of the shape of the metric, they can't return arbitrarily close to the x axis. As a result, for instance p / ∈ I + (p ′ ). Note that the points on the segments (s, p] and (r, q] on the x axis have the same chronological future, and the points on the segments [p, r) and [q, s) have the same chronological past.
Another method, perhaps simpler, to define the filter is as follows. I describe it for the filter denoted F in the figure, the other cases being analogous. Take a sequence p n = (0, 1/n, 0), p n → p, and define U n = {z = (a, b, c) :
This filter has the same causal effect of the one described using the Taylor expansion, however, note that it has a characteristic flower shape and not an elliptic one as in the figure. 
Strengthening the definition of causal continuity
Finally, I give the proof to the results mentioned in the introduction.
Theorem 4.1. If the spacetime is future (past) reflecting then
In particular, feeble distinction and future (past) reflectivity imply past (resp. future) distinction.
Proof. If the spacetime is future reflecting then D
Thus under future reflectivity, (x, y) ∈ J + and (y, x) ∈ D + p is equivalent to (x, y) ∈ J + and (y, x) ∈ D + which by feeble distinction implies x = y. The proof in the other case is analogous.
Corollary 4.2.
A spacetime is causally continuous iff it is feebly distinguishing and reflecting.
Proof. The only if part is trivial as it follows from the usual definition of causal continuity as a spacetime which is distinguishing and reflecting. For the if part note that by theorem 4.1, feeble distinction and past reflectivity imply future distinction. Moreover, feeble distinction and future reflectivity imply past distinction, thus feeble distinction and reflectivity imply distinction. Thus the spacetime is distinguishing and using again the assumed reflectivity the causal continuity follows.
Feeble distinction implies causality, however, in the definition of causal continuity causality cannot replace feeble distinction, indeed it is quite easy to construct an example of spacetime which is causal, reflecting and non-feebly distinguishing (and hence non-causally continuous), see figure 1(A) . Actually, this example is also non-total imprisoning. I shall prove in a related work [5] that feeble distinction implies non-total imprisonment which implies causality. However, in the definition of causal continuity feeble distinction can not even be relaxed to non-total imprisoning as the example of figure 1(A) again proves.
Conclusions
The property of weak distinction has been studied showing that it is equivalent to the antisymmetry of the causal relation D + defined by Eq. (1). The set D + enters also in an alternative definition of reflectivity, namely the condition D + = A + . Between weak distinction and causality I defined another level, called feeble distinction. Examples have been provided which show that feeble distinction indeed differs from weak distinction and causality (actually it differs from nontotal imprisonment).
Next a basic step has been the proof that feeble distinction and future (past) reflectivity implies past (resp. future) distinction, a curious statement that mixes future and past properties. Using it, it has been finally shown that in the definition of causal continuity it is possible to replace the distinction property with feeble distinction. Some known examples prevent the possibility of weakening the feeble distinction property to the level which stays immediately below it in the causal ladder. Since the causal ladder is not fixed, and new levels can always be found, there is some natural uncertainty on what this optimality could mean. In any case I will show in a related work [5] that the non-total imprisonment property stays between feeble distinction and causality, and figure 1(A) proves that in the definition of causal continuity, feeble distinction can not be replaced by non-total imprisonment. In this sense, the definition of causal continuity given in this work is optimal.
